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Abstract
The international community has joined together in an effort to combat human trafficking.
Utilizing the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, commonly known as the Palermo Protocols, the focus of combatant
efforts has been tailored to fit three categories: prosecution, prevention, and protection. Because
the attention of several countries appears to be primarily devoted to prosecution, protection often
falls victim to indifference, leaving victims without the care that they need to readjust to daily
life. While the three components are supposedly equal in weight, this inequality is apparent in
several countries through their anti-trafficking efforts. In this paper, I examine why some states
offer greater levels of commitment to the protection component of the Palermo Protocols on
human trafficking than others by examining a possible interactive effect between domestic and
international factors. While the interaction was not found to be statistically significant,
international factors measured by a state’s level of international involvement as well as the
domestic factor considering the presence of strict immigration policies provide a greater
understanding of the topic as a whole and guidance for future research endeavors.
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Introduction
Today, one of the issues plaguing every country is human trafficking. In 2018, the
United States Polaris-operated hotline for human trafficking received reports of 10,949 cases
(Polaris 2020). Because human trafficking is an underreported crime, it is likely that this number
is only a mere fraction of the actual cases in the United States. This is just an example of one
country; it is practically impossible to know how many cases actually exist in the world. During
human trafficking, victims are removed from their homes and are trafficked into forced labor,
sex trafficking, or organ extraction.
According to the International Labour Organization, commonly referred to as the ILO,
there were an estimated 40.3 million individuals who were trafficked into a modern form of
slavery. Of these 40.3 million individuals, about 62% were trafficked into forced labor, and the
remaining 38% were trafficked into forced marriages. If the 62%, or 24.9 million people, who
were trafficked into forced labor is broken down further, it is shown that 16 million were forced
to work in the private sector, and 4.8 million were sexually exploited. To dig a little deeper into
the characteristics of the victims, 58% of victims of forced labor in the private sector and in labor
imposed by state authorities are women, and 99% of victims who are sexually exploited are also
women (International Labour Organization 2017). To make matters worse, many perpetrators
are known to the victim (Polaris 2020). Countries, such as China, that have a disproportionate
number of female victims who are frequently trafficked to forcibly serve as mothers or brides are
commonly identified as destination countries (CIA, 2015). Countries where the victims originate
are referred to as source countries.
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In the past few years, the international community has worked to alleviate this atrocity.
To do so, they created the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons Especially Women and Children, a three-prong plan that includes efforts to prosecute
traffickers, prevent trafficking, and protect victims (OHCHR 2000). Prevention focuses on the
efforts of a state to deter human trafficking through the use of training programs and the creation
of laws against trafficking. Prosecution seeks to measure the country’s attempt at locating and
prosecuting traffickers. The last of the three and the focus of this paper, protection, looks at how
states work to prevent the criminalization of victims, offer resources to help victims heal, and
provide assistance to assist victims in their quest to regain some normalcy. Of the three,
prosecution and prevention tend to be the primary focus of the majority of states (Cho, Dreher,
and Neumayer 2014). Protection is often the recipient of the least attention and resources.
While some countries understand the importance of protection and comply with this section of
the international efforts, others fail to do so. Over time, this variation has failed to dissipate as
many states continue to ignore the importance of protectionist policies. Why is it that some
countries offer greater levels of commitment to the protection component of the Palermo
Protocols on human trafficking than others?
If a better understanding of this topic can be achieved, a plan of action to improve
compliance and the devotion of resources for protectionist policies can be formed by the
international community, including cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and international organizations (IOs). In order to improve this understanding, an answer must be
discovered to the previous question. Past literature on the matter focuses on the independent
effects of various domestic factors or international factors on a state’s willingness to comply with
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protectionist policies. While both factors are essential components for answering this question,
studying them independently creates a gap in the explanation. For instance, the study of
domestic factors omits the influence of international pressures while focusing solely on
international factors fails to account for the domestic cost analysis that impacts decisions. For
this reason, this paper seeks to answer the earlier question by looking at two overarching factors
acting jointly as an interactive variable contributing to enhanced protection. The first is domestic
factors as determined by immigration policies, and the second is international factors illustrated
by a country’s involvement in the international community.
To test this theory, I use information from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, World
Population Policies created by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
and Cho’s 3-P Index (Cho 2015a; Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015; Gygli,
Haelg, and Sturm 2018). To analyze these data, I utilize an ordinary least squared (OLS)
regression model to predict variations in protection scores.
In analyzing the results from this model, I failed to find support for the theory that the
level of international involvement and domestic factors as shown through immigration policies
are conjunctively determinants of protection compliance. The presence of strict international
policies had no impact on the effect of international involvement in determining compliance.
Furthermore, the presence of strict immigration policies was found to be insignificant. While
this is true, the significance of the variable pertaining to international involvement provides
insight into the power of the international community to influence compliance decisions. In
terms of domestic factors, these findings did not rule out their involvement completely. While
immigration policies were not related to compliance, the analysis showed that a different factor,
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the control over corruption, may provide a new path for evaluating compliance decisions in the
future.
I structure the remainder of the paper in the following way. First, I outline the relevant
literature on human trafficking, particularly emphasizing scholarship on variations in types of
human trafficking policies and in the proposed theoretical explanations for these variations.
Then, I outline my theory as to the relationship between domestic immigration policies and the
state’s political involvement in the international community, looking at an interactive effect
between these two elements. The following section will disclose the method of estimation
utilized as well as a detailed description of the analyzed variables. Next, the results of the model
will be discussed followed by a discussion of the results in relation to the overall research
question and theory. Finally, I offer concluding thoughts on how this empirical analysis can help
further the understanding of compliance with protection efforts related to human trafficking and
how future research can expand on this understanding.
Explaining Protection Compliance: Four Views
Over the years, the issue of human trafficking has posed a growing threat to the world’s
population, especially for Southeast Asia and Central Africa (United Nations 2019; U.S.
Department of State 2018). Having grown substantially in profitability, the industry reached a
profit level of around $150 billion in 2014 (International Labour Organization 2014). Since then,
this number has likely grown as human trafficking does not appear to have slowed its pace.
Governments around the globe have worked to find ways of combating this practice, and several
scholars have worked diligently to create indices to measure the efforts of these states.

5

One index, utilized by the United States (U.S.) Department of State, is the tier system that
classifies each state into one of three tiers based on their combatting efforts (U.S. Department of
State 2019). While this report makes it possible to see distinctly which states outperform the
rest, this index fails to break down the score into the different components of compliance, which
will be detailed later. Instead of focusing on the specific areas where states excel and where
states need to devote more attention, the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports offer only a
generalized ranking based on the overall score. This score makes it possible for two states to
receive that same score while having different levels of commitment to various components of
anti-trafficking efforts (Cho 2015c).
To resolve this inconsistency, Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2014) constructed an index
consisting of three components based on the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children created by the United Nations,
commonly known as the Palermo Protocol. This Protocol displayed an international attempt to
resolve this global concern, and it disaggregates the components into three categories:
prevention, prosecution, and protection (OHCHR 2000). Following suit, the previously
mentioned scholars modeled their index in the same three-component categorization. Although
it is noted that all three components are essential to a successful anti-trafficking effort, many
states focus primarily on the prosecution component and largely ignore protection (Cho, Dreher,
and Neumayer 2014). Protection, in this sense, focuses on a state’s efforts to ensure that victims
are not prosecuted as criminals and are not required to engage in self-identification as proof of
being a victim, to provide legal assistance during legal proceedings, to provide residence permits
and basic housing, to ensure that proper medical care is provided, and to provide all resources
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needed to help the victim be able to get back to a sense of normalcy (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer
2014, 434)
While state leaders are major contributors to this inequality, it cannot be said that outside
influences from international actors did not assist them in moving in such a direction. Advice on
ways to combat trafficking from the international community and international anti-trafficking
policies have largely prioritized the need to prosecute traffickers at all costs (Siddharth 2011);
such suggestions omit the needs of victims. Following the international emphasis on
prosecution, some countries link the protection of victims with their willingness to aid in the
investigations of law enforcement (Brunovskis 2013; Davy 2016; Pearson 2002). For instance,
human trafficking victims in Belgium and the Netherlands receive entirely different levels of
protection depending on whether or not they aid an investigation, regardless of whether or not it
is in their best interest to do so. Refusing to offer assistance can result in deportation as an
illegal immigrant; however, agreeing to help can result in an extended stay in the country,
medical services, legal aid, counseling, financial help, and language courses (Pearson 2002, 57).
Despite their similar practices, even these countries differ in their protection score as the
Netherlands score two points lower than Belgium, showing the presence of significant variation
of protection even among countries with great similarities (Cho 2015a). While many countries
similarly ignore the necessity of the protection component of the UN Protocol, other states work
to comply, leaving the question of why certain states contribute greater resources to the
protection component than others.
When a state has failed to meet its international promises, other states often view this as a
sign of deviance. The appearance is that the violating state ratified the treaty without any
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intention of complying. With this in mind, states are less likely to trust them in future
agreements, resulting in the deviant state’s removal from future negotiations. The looming threat
of such consequences can be an effective tool for pressuring ratifying states to comply with the
protection component of the Protocol. An example of such a threat working to encourage
compliance can be seen in Japan. In 2004, the annual TIP Report detailed the deportation of
trafficking victims from the country by Japanese officials (U.S. Department of State 2004).
Following the criticism from this report, the Japanese government responded by working to
cease the criminalization of trafficking victims (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006).
It appears as though Japan was fearful of the consequences of such a report and, as a result, made
an effort to help salvage their reputation in the international community and to offer greater
protection for individuals within the state. Looking at the broader picture, overall compliance
with human rights treaties has been increasing as the subject of the treaty becomes a greater
international norm and noncompliance begins to cause greater damage to a country’s reputation
(Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2010). If compliance with the protection component follows
the pattern of other human rights treaties, this case is just the beginning of change.
The concept that a state’s level of commitment to protectionist policies is a result of the
international community’s opinion showcases the impact that the expanding international
community has on domestic policies. As the community continues to become more
interdependent, this concept may become more applicable, but it still leaves a gap in explaining
why some states with a lower number of international ties succeed in complying. While the
above explanation details how large numbers of international ties can influence the actions of a
state, it only applies to states that are active internationally. The reach of the international
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community, however, is restricted by the state’s ability to choose whether or not it will open
itself up to the scrutiny of the community by becoming more involved internationally and
gaining the accompanying responsibilities. Isolationist states that are quite indifferent about the
opinion of the community are not likely to be so concerned about their reputation, minimizing
the cost of noncompliance (Lipson 1991). This thought also seems to assume that states are
willing to afford any cost in order to maintain a positive reputation. While it is possible that
some states may go to great lengths to preserve their reputation, others may find that the benefit
does not outweigh the cost.
The next approach to answering the question of compliance utilizes a rational-actor
approach. This model suggests that states make decisions to comply or not based on their ability
to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs, both tangible and intangible. Utilizing the
expected cost to a state’s reputation as detailed earlier in this section, scholars have found that
states tend to act in a manner that gains them praise from the major international powers (Cho
and Vadlamannati 2012). In order to achieve this goal, many states have focused on the
components with the greatest benefit while foregoing commitment to the one with fewer
benefits: namely, protection. The focus of the international community is to reduce the flow of
human trafficking. As reduction is the main goal, it receives great attention from various
countries because states may be able to improve their stance internationally if they can assist the
community in this effort. Directly related to this goal, prevention and prosecution offer a more
streamlined approach to meeting this demand (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012). Due to the greater
benefit associated with these two components, protection is often excluded as it is a low-benefit
and high-cost component.
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To further diminish the importance of the protection component, the language in various
policies, including the UN’s Protocol, appears to provide great detail in the areas of prevention
and prosecution while offering only vague details for protection. As numerous scholars looked
into the efforts of Australia, Nigeria, and South Africa to combat human trafficking, they found
that there was an issue in the UN’s Protocol that may have contributed to poorer compliance with
protection: the language used in the Protocol lacked compulsivity and remains unclear in its
expectations (Bello 2018; Davy 2016; Olateru-Olagbegi and Ikpeme 2006). When deciding
where protection needs to be applied, Olateru-Olagbegi and Ikpeme pointed out that the Protocol
only indicated that it is to be applied in “appropriate cases” (2006, 12). Another scholar
suggested that even the UN was aware of this shortcoming as they later began to offer additional
materials to help guide protectionist efforts (Davy 2016). The suggestion that more attention
was given to prevention and prosecution can lead to the assumption that these two areas are to be
the main focus of the international community and possess the greatest benefits for states that
comply with them. With this indication, rational states would be expected to devote fewer
resources to a component that has an associated cost that is greater than its benefits, resulting in a
lower level of compliance.
Through this approach, it can be seen that international pressure may not be the only
determinant for compliance. In addition to its impact, this concept demonstrates the effect of
domestic components in the decision-making process. It pushes the work beyond the
international view and into a country-level approach. Despite this progress, this approach
maintains a large assumption about the various national governments. It assumes that these
governments are rational actors, but it is not feasible for the leaders to be perfectly rational in
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their decisions. Truly rational actors make decisions based on complete information of the
current situation and all possible outcomes and utilize this information to reap the greatest
benefit for the lowest cost. As it is impossible for a person to know a hundred percent of the
information, they do not meet the requirements of being a rational actor. They cannot see the
future to know for certain that their decision will result in the greatest benefit, and it is possible
to make a commitment where the true consequence of noncompliance is unknown (Simmons
2009). Whereas it may not be costly to ignore the protection component now, it may become so
in the future as the norm of protecting victims grows, altering the cost-benefit analysis.
Continuing to look at domestic factors, the presence of laws pertaining to the legal status
of prostitution has been seen to impact human trafficking levels and, more noteworthy for the
scope of this paper, to inhibit any improvement of, or even worsen, compliance levels for
protection (Cho 2015b). The foundation for this discussion is the economic aspect of human
trafficking. Scholars initially studied the impact of legalized prostitution on the inflow of human
trafficking. Utilizing the law of supply and demand, they concluded that countries with legalized
prostitution were likely to increase demand and, as a result of this, increase supply.
Alternatively, the heightened risk of continuing to participate in the market for prostitution where
such acts were illegal drove both demand and supply down (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2013).
As a result, the level of inflow of human trafficking decreased, reducing the size of the market.
A comparative case that illustrates this point can be found in the differences between Sweden
and Germany in 2004. At this time, Germany had a population that was about ten times larger
than that of Sweden, and the former country offered liberal prostitution policies while the latter
maintained a stricter stance. Despite the size of the difference in population, the ILO estimated
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that the number of human trafficking victims in Germany was approximately sixty-two times
greater than that of Sweden, demonstrating the possible consequence of liberal prostitution
policies (Cho, Dreher, and Neumeyer 2013; Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006). Such
economic logic and similar cases around the globe appeared to influence the stance of the U.S.
government. In their annual TIP Report, the U.S. Department of State commented on the
nation’s view of prostitution by saying, “Prostitution is inherently harmful and dehumanizing
and fuels trafficking in persons” (2007, 27).
Within the legalization debate, there are two competing views. One side views
prostitution as a choice that people make to commercialize sex. With this view, they believe that
the legalization of prostitution would provide a safer work environment for these individuals as
the increase in the supply of workers would reduce the likelihood of a person being forced to
continue in the industry or perform nonconsensual acts (Cho 2015b). The contrasting view sees
prostitution as being a consequence of a patriarchial society; therefore, they believe that all
women who are involved in prostitution are victims of this society (Cho 2015b). When it comes
to the argument of legalizing prostitution, it is clear to see that the latter view favors the abolition
of the practice and supports illegalizing prostitution. In reference to protection policies, Cho has
found that the legalization of prostitution fails to have a positive impact on these policies and can
make matters worse for victims in some societies, which may be the result of the logic of
pro-legalization cultures (2015b). The abolitionist view categorizes all prostitutes, even those
who are there illegally, as victims. As such, they require care and protection. The other
argument for legalization views them as simply workers who have no need for protection outside
of protection from prosecution due to their chosen career. Here, victims from other countries are
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more likely to be treated as an illegal immigrant and must be prosecuted accordingly, resulting in
low protection compliance.
Not only does this research show that legalization of prostitution can increase the inflow
of human trafficking due to the increased demand for prostitution, but it also shows that
legalization can detract from progress for the protection of victims and even decrease the current
protection levels. This can aid policymakers in their decisions as it provides them with the
insight that legalizing prostitution could negatively impact their efforts to combat human
trafficking. It also helps scholars to see the impact that domestic policies can have on a global
issue. The legalization of prostitution in one country can result in the trafficking of an individual
in another country to meet the demand of the former. Even though this can contribute to policy
decisions, the explanation behind this argument appears to isolate the discussion to two,
opposing beliefs. This would assume that all countries are on one side or the other with nobody
in between. While this adds simplicity to the concept, it fails to explain the connection between
the two variables when the mindset of the country’s leaders are not so distinctly on one side of
the legalization debate.
The final approach for this section focuses on the effect of immigration policies on victim
protection. On this topic, scholars have found that stricter immigration laws often result in the
worsening of protection for human trafficking victims (Amahazion 2014; Amiel 2006). Behind
this conclusion, there are two different explanations for this occurrence. One suggests that
domestic concerns are the primary reason. Referring back to the earlier discussion on costs,
there is a greater cost to protection compliance. Especially in regards to the state’s immigration
policies, compliance would require resources to alter existing policies (Cho and Vadlamannati
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2012). While this may appear to be a minor expense, each action is likely to have its own set of
consequences that will increase the primary cost. In this case, the consequences could be an
increase in immigration. For states with low levels of immigration, this may not pose a great
liability; however, states with high levels may find it difficult and costly to increase levels
further, resulting in a lower willingness to weaken existing policies and a decreased amount of
protection for the victims (Cho 2015b).
The second explanation with regards to immigration acknowledges the goal of the
international community to reduce human trafficking. As states work to achieve the goal of
reducing trafficking at home, they may choose to restrict immigration. Per the conclusion of
Danailova-Trainor and Belser, stricter immigration policies can reduce trafficking (2006). It is
believed that the stricter policies will allow for the removal of people from the country who are
there illegally and may be participating in human trafficking. The other hope is that the
heightened risk of crossing borders illegally once strict policies are enacted will deter traffickers
from attempting to enter their country. This is a great contrast from what states fear may happen
with lenient immigration policies. If states allow more immigration into their country, they may
attract more people seeking a different country to reside in. This is not to suggest that the state is
reluctant to help such individuals; they are more concerned about the safety of these individuals
during their journey to the country. As they travel to their location, they become vulnerable to
traffickers who may harm them along the way. In the end, the concern is that relaxed
immigration policies will increase the number of human trafficking victims as it attracts a large
group of people who will be more vulnerable to such horrors (Cho and Vadlamanatti 2012). As
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a means to prevent such atrocities, states believe that their best choice is to strengthen their
immigration laws.
While these strengthened policies may achieve the state’s goal of reducing human
trafficking, they may also worsen conditions for the victims who will likely receive less
protection from the government. Often, the victims have nowhere to turn to for assistance;
furthermore, many victims are aware that their families and communities are likely to ostracize
them as they are now viewed as being impure. One victim from Myanmar who was trafficked
around the age of forty-six was interviewed by Human Rights Watch, and she spoke about her
concerns surrounding her return home to Kachin State. She stated that the Kachin society “looks
down” on people who have sexual relations, consensual or forced, outside of marriage. As a
victim, she was terrified of how her own society would treat her upon her return, and she was not
the only one with such concerns (Human Rights Watch 2019). Due to this fear and the fact that
many cannot afford to go anywhere else, it would be in their best interest to remain in the
country without fear of deportation. Because of the stricter immigration policies that are being
enacted, however, it is not likely that their interests will be protected. Because these trafficking
victims are not often legal citizens of the country where they are trafficked, it is probable that
they will also fall victim to the purge on illegal immigrants. Because of their status as illegal
immigrants, they will likely be prosecuted as a criminal and be deported from the country,
offering them no form of protection. As can be seen, the objective of prosecution through
tougher immigration laws can reduce the protection of victims and treat them equally to their
traffickers.
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A major part of this approach is that it does not simply assume that all states fail to
comply due to their domestic needs. It stretches past the self-interest approach to explain why
those states that are actively seeking a solution to this problem regardless of the cost may choose
to forgo compliance with the protection component of the Protocol. This provides insight on two
different thoughts and how each one factors into the overall discussion on protection. One
assumption that this approach does make, however, is that states are incapable of separating
victims from other criminals. The assumption is that states will participate in mass deportation
without first attempting to identify the victims. While this may be the case in some situations,
this idea may be flawed for others where a genuine effort to protect victims from deportation is
present. It also fails to demonstrate the impact of the entire international community on states’
decisions. The refusal to reduce immigration policies and offer greater protection because of the
risk of increasing human trafficking demonstrates the belief of some that prevention should be
maintained even at the expense of protection, but other groups may offer contrasting views that
the two objectives are equal and should be treated as such. This approach only looks at a portion
of the international community while excluding the impact of the remaining groups.
While each approach has benefited the study of why some states commit to the protection
component of the UN Protocol while others neglect it, two approaches appear to have the
greatest impact: the number of international ties and the strictness of immigration policies. The
first allows scholars to utilize knowledge on a factor that is likely to grow over time as the
international community continues to become more connected, and the second helps show the
considerations of both self-focused and international goal-oriented states. While these are both
beneficial to the overall question, they still fall short on their own. The discussion on a state’s
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involvement internationally fails to acknowledge domestic factors that contribute to the
compliance levels as well. The later discussion that demonstrates the impact of immigration
laws on compliance neglects to account for the impact of the growing international norm of
protection on states’ compliance levels. Instead, it assumes that states will remain focused on the
primary goal of decreasing human trafficking as suggested by the Protocol. Despite their
individual shortcomings, I believe that both discussions can work together to create a new
approach centered on the idea that it is a combination of international and domestic factors that
impact a state’s decision to comply.
Despite the reality that the international community is growing, a few states remain
focused solely on their own self interest without regards for their international reputation.
Because of this, the focus cannot be shifted solely onto the actions of the international
community, but this is not to mean that its importance is not to be acknowledged. A new
approach combining both domestic and international factors could add the domestic focus
needed to improve the discussion of international involvement and show the impact of the entire
international community on the protection policies of various countries. This would allow for a
study to be performed on the actions of states that have numerous ties and strict immigration
policies, providing a foundation that further efforts to improve protection compliance can work
from.
Theory
As made evident by the wording of the UN Protocol, the original international push was
to focus on decreasing the rate of human trafficking with the understanding that some attempt
should be made to protect the victims. Victim protection, however, was not at the forefront of
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this effort as much as prevention and prosecution were. The push from various groups for
greater victim protection has led to the growth of a protectionist norm in the international
community. It has grown to the point that the UN is now introducing informational resources on
protection measures to help redirect the focus of states and to move protection to an equal
position with its two counterparts, but some countries did not follow this direction, creating the
question as to why some did and others did not (Brunovskis 2013, Davy 2016). Two main
components will be evaluated in this study in association with this decision to comply or not:
international influence and domestic cost factors.
This emergent norm has allowed the international community to have the ability to
generate greater compliance from states. Following the pattern from other international treaties,
especially human rights treaties, states begin to develop a reputation for themselves as they
become more connected within the international community (Lipson 1991). Depending on the
state’s actions, this reputation can have great benefits or substantial consequences for states
seeking to continue and grow their international involvement. For this reason, scholars have
found that states with strong international ties are more likely to ensure the protection of victims
by making sure that they are not criminalized and that they have the needed assistance
(Amahazion 2014; Avdeyeva 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). When states ratify treaties,
they are willingly tying their reputation to their promise to comply with the treaty’s requirements
(Lipson 1991). If they comply, their reputation remains intact. Failure to comply, however, can
leave a lasting impression of being a deviant actor that will result in lasting consequences
(Avdeyeva 2007). Such consequences are the exclusion from future negotiations and difficulty
in future negotiations due to a history of noncompliance (Lipson 1991).
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In addition to international costs, governments must also take domestic costs into
consideration. Implementing new policies can require the use of various resources such as time
and money. Once these policies are in place, there is often little desire to use further resources to
alter them. For states that have implemented strict anti-immigration policies, whether it be for
domestic reasons or as a means to decrease human trafficking, it can be costly to retract and issue
new policies to replace the old (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012). They would be required to take
time away from other issues, to create training programs to educate people on how to comply
with the new policy, and to cover a variety of other costs. With these expenses, it would be
irrational to make a decision to alter their policies for the benefit of protection, especially when
there is a concern that it could jeopardize the success of prosecutorial efforts. As a result, states
with strict immigration policies are not likely to receive a high rating for protection.
While each perspective discussed in the previous section has a role to play in its own
right, they each leave some unanswered questions. The presence of international ties does not
explain the impact of domestic costs, and the expense of altering immigration policies does not
explain the effects of the international community on such decisions. They do, however, appear
as though they could act as complements to each other. For instance, the presence or absence of
strict immigration policies may affect how impactful international efforts are for encouraging
greater protection, creating an interactive effect. The remaining piece of the puzzle is how
countries act when their characteristics create contrasting costs. In this paper, the effects of
complementary international and domestic costs, both for and against protection compliance, and
the effects of contradictory costs will be covered in regards to their effect on the levels of
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commitment. Associated with these factors, there are four main combinations and three primary
outcomes as is shown in table 1.
Table 1: Theorized outcomes related to interactive variables
Less Restrictive
Immigration Policies

Restrictive Immigration
Policies

High Level of
Political Globalization

High Protection
Compliance

Middle Protection
Compliance

Low Level of Political
Globalization

Middle Protection
Compliance

Low Protection
Compliance

For states with strong international ties and lenient immigration policies, it would be
expected that they would have greater levels of commitment to protectionist policies. This
commitment would originate from the analysis of the two levels of cost mentioned earlier.
Domestically, policies are less restrictive, decreasing the rate of deportation and criminalization
of victims. With this type of policy in place, there is not an additional cost needed to transform
the legislation into something that would better ensure victim protection. On an international
level, there is a cost present, but this penalizes states for noncompliance rather than adding an
expense to comply. If countries fail to comply with protectionist policies, the consequences
detailed previously would ensue.
On the other hand, benefits can result from upholding these policies. Protecting victims
can demonstrate to the international community the state’s willingness to cooperate with others
and commit to various efforts. Such attention can boost a country’s reputation and help them be
more involved in negotiations and new treaties. In the end, states with several ties and lenient
policies only have a cost if they fail to comply. If they decide to implement protectionist
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policies, they are likely to find a reputational benefit attached to such actions, resulting in a
rational decision that would likely result in a greater commitment to victim protection.
As a complete opposite of the situation detailed before, states with few or no international
ties and strict immigration policies are likely to have lower protection compliance. Contrary to
the earlier outcome of low domestic cost, countries in this situation would find that there is a
domestic cost to alter their current policies toward immigration. Because strong immigration
policies typically result in greater amounts of deportation, including the deportation of victims,
they are not conducive to greater protection (Amahazion 2014). This means that compliance
would require a transformation of these policies that would result in more lenient policies or the
improvement of practices for separating victims from illegal immigrants. This cost may deter
countries from making such changes and from improving the protection of victims.
On an international level, there is no longer a cost of noncompliance that would offset the
cost of domestic compliance nor is there any true benefit for compliance. If a state is not
internationally active, it is unlikely that they care significantly about their international
reputation (Lipson 1991). As reputational threats are what is frequently used to pressure states to
comply, international pressure will be ineffective for states that are unbothered by such
consequences. In this case, there are no consequences on an international or domestic scale for
noncompliance. There is not a benefit for compliance, and the only cost would be to improve
compliance domestically. As a result, states that are not well intertwined with the international
community and that have strict immigration laws are more likely to choose to forgo compliance
with protectionist policies as the result of their cost-benefit analysis.
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With combined characteristics, some countries may find themselves in an area that does
not fit into one of the two classifications above. It may be the case that a state has a mixture of
the two factors and has numerous international ties while also having strict immigration policies,
producing a medial level of compliance. Based on the previous discussion, there are
international costs for noncompliance and domestic costs for compliance. The question remains
as to whether international pressure will triumph with high compliance or domestic factors will
lead to low protection for victims. A third option could lie somewhere in between.
For instance, countries may find that they have few to no international ties and lenient
immigration policies. This scenario positions the country between the two extremes.
Consequently, it would be anticipated that these states would see a middle level of compliance.
Unlike internationally involved states, these states do not have a cost associated with
noncompliance. With relaxed immigration policies, it is likely that they are criminalizing fewer
victims than those with stringent policies, creating a greater level of compliance. What restricts
this compliance from growing even more, however, is the lack of an international cost of
noncompliance and the lack of an international benefit for complying. This leaves the state with
no true incentive to provide greater protection for victims beyond what already exists in their
domestic policies.
What could possibly drive this level to more of a middle point rather than a lower
position is the prospect of becoming more involved in the international community. While a
state may currently have few international ties, they may intend on becoming more
internationally active in the future. As an effort to show the sincerity of their commitment, they
could choose to demonstrate greater compliance with the protection component of the Protocol,
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increasing compliance. While this may appear as though it should generate high levels of
commitment, the fact that there is no immediate benefit will likely lead to the restriction of
compliance, causing these states to display a medium level of compliance.
Finally, when a country immerses itself in the international community, it is not likely
that they will turn away from their obligations. The reputational cost for noncompliance along
with the benefits previously discussed would coerce a rational actor to act in a manner that
protects victims in order to minimize costs and maximize benefits. On the domestic front,
choosing to alter policies will be very costly, and deciding to make such changes could upset
government officials and other citizens, possibly jeopardizing the stability of the country. In
response to this cost, governments will likely decide to leave policies as they are, but this does
not mean that efforts cannot be made to improve compliance with the protection component of
the Protocol. Another avenue for compliance, such as providing training to law enforcement
officers on how to tell the signs of a human trafficking victim, could be utilized by states to
minimize this cost without failing to comply entirely. While this may not result in the same level
of compliance as states with strong ties and lenient policies, it is probable that it will result in
greater compliance than states with few ties and strict policies, placing them somewhere in
between. In summary, it is expected that countries with numerous international ties and strict
immigration policies will see improvement in commitment levels as a result of international
pressure, but such improvement will be limited by the domestic costs.
Hypothesis: States that have high levels of engagement in the international community will offer
greater protection to human trafficking victims and contribute greater resources to this endeavor,
but this effect will be lower for states with strict immigration policies that will limit the influence of
the international involvement on protection compliance.
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Research Design
Previously, I theorized that a combination of international pressure and domestic costs
alters the level of protection offered to human trafficking victims. Put plainly, the level of
compliance with protectionist human trafficking policies is dependent upon a country’s level of
involvement in the international community and the cost of altering current domestic policies to
better promote victim protection. The three main variables of focus are a state’s degree of
international involvement, their domestic legal policies, and their level of protection provided for
victims of human trafficking.
For this study, the dependent variable will be the 2014 protection score for 179 countries
provided by Cho’s 3-P Index (2015a). This index evaluates each country’s prosecutorial,
preventive, and protectionist efforts, with an overall index score being the aggregate of all three
components. For each factor, the scores range from one to five with one being the least
compliant, and five indicating the greatest amount of compliance. Due to the nature of my
theoretical argument, only protection efforts will be covered in the analysis. In order to measure
the protection efforts, nine key elements of a legitimate protection effort are examined: “no
punishment of victims; imposing no self-identification in order to prove their status as a victim;
assistance for legal proceedings; the provision of residence permits; basic services for housing;
medical care; job training; assistance for rehabilitation; assistance for repatriation” (Cho, Dreher,
and Neumayer 2014, 434). A score of one indicates that a country is making “no effort” to offer
protection, and a score of five indicates that a state is making a “very strong effort” to protect
victims (ibid).
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As mentioned in an earlier section, Cho’s index offers a more detailed look at the efforts
of a country to protect victims than the United States Department of State’s tier system. The tier
system only offers an overall glance at countries’ anti-human trafficking efforts instead of a
disaggregated measurement that would allow for a closer examination of the various components
that make up such efforts. In order to focus on a specific factor, readers must utilize a qualitative
analysis of the country within the reports. Unlike this measurement, Cho’s index offers a
quantitative measurement of three different components, allowing for a more in-depth evaluation
of each country’s efforts to protect victims. The 3-P Index utilized the US Department of State’s
Annual Trafficking in Persons report and Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to evaluate each state’s performance (Cho,
Dreher, and Neumayer 2014). While utilizing data from the US Department of State may
incorporate a slight bias into the index, this bias is controlled by the inclusion of the UNODC’s
reports that incorporates an international perspective. This creates a source of information that is
free from the domestic biases found within a U.S. agency.
For my independent variable measuring a country’s level of international involvement, I
use the 2013 KOF political globalization score, which is one of three component parts of the
KOF measure of globalization. This measure will allow for the evaluation of each country’s
international involvement. This score considers the number of embassies in a state, the amount
of personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping missions, the number of international NGOs the
state is associated with, the number of IOs the state is a part of, and the number of partners a
state has in investment treaties (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018). Based on these six components,
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each country is scored on a scale from one to one hundred. A score of one is indicative of no
international involvement, and a score of 100 indicates the greatest amount of involvement.
Because international involvement can take different forms, it is necessary to utilize a
measurement that does not focus solely on one type of involvement. For example, a state may
not be part of many NGOs, but they may still be a member of several IOs. If the involvement
with NGOs was the only thing that was measured, it is likely that this example country would
have been overlooked in the study. Due to such a possibility, the KOF score was selected to
ensure that all forms of international activity were accounted for. This data also provides
coverage of the greatest number of countries, creating a fairly decent sample of 189 countries to
study. This helps to prevent bias toward one specific type of country and allows for more fitting
inferences to be made about the greater population.
To operationalize the independent variable evaluating a country’s domestic legal policies,
I look at the stringency of its immigration policies. As discussed previously, a state with strict
immigration policies is likely to criminalize a greater number of victims than a country with
lenient policies (Amahazion 2014). Because of this, such states would need to alter their
immigration policies to be more lenient in order to offer greater protection to victims. Such costs
associated with these alterations are likely to deter the country from making an effort to comply
with protectionist policies. To measure this variable, I use the 2013 World Population Policies
Database created by the population division of the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (UNDESA). These data cover 196 countries with available data (Department of
Economic and Social Affairs 2015). Other data sources were considered, but many excluded
countries that were not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (OECD). Because OECD members tend to be more economically developed than
non-members, utilizing data that only consists of OECD countries would bias the results as the
varying characteristics of the entire population would not be accurately represented. Because of
this, the data from UNDESA was selected.
This report classifies policies into three categories based on their intended effects on
immigration: “lower”, “maintain”, or “raise”. There are two other groups that are often
collapsed into one category: “no intervention” and “no policy” (Department of Economic and
Social Affairs 2015). To quantify this data, the variable was dichotomized to indicate whether or
not the country employed strict immigration policies. States aiming to maintain or raise
immigration were coded as a zero as well as states that did not interfere with immigration or had
no existing policies. As these states were not attempting to impose restrictions to immigration,
they are classified as not having strict policies. Contrary to these countries, the remaining states
that were intending to lower immigration were coded as a one, indicating restrictive policies.
In addition to examining the relationship of these variables to my dependent variable
independently, I also consider the possibility of an interactive effect. As my theory states, a
state’s level of compliance is not solely reliant upon one of these variables. Instead, it is the two
variables in conjunction to each other that cause an impact. The effect of one is dependent on
the presence of the other. To measure this, the two independent variables detailed above will be
interacted. The interaction variable is the product of the dichotomous immigration variable and
the continuous KOF political globalization score. By doing this, it can be seen whether the
presence of one influences the effect of the other. In the scope of this paper, the interaction will
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show whether or not the presence of strict immigration policies will impact the effect of
international involvement on a state’s protection score.
Following the independent variables, I also include three control variables: polity score,
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and corruption. Identified by the investigations of
other scholars, these controls were selected to control for the various factors that have been
found to impact a country’s decision to offer protection to victims or not. By controlling for
these various factors, an isolated assessment of the independent variables’ effect on protection
can be conducted.
The use of the 2013 polity score from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict
Research (2019) allows for the control of the effect that a state’s level of democratization can
have on protectionist policies. More democratic countries are likely to offer greater protection to
victims as a failure to do so would risk the realization of political consequences in the next
election. This research will also utilize the measurement of GDP per capita for the year 2013
that is provided by the World Bank (2020). The economic position of a country can alter a
state’s capacity to offer protection. As this is not what this paper is intending to assess, it is
important that such an impact is controlled for. To allow for a more normal distribution of the
data, this variable was reformatted to be the natural log of GDP per capita. Finally, this study
will control for a state’s control of corruption. A country with a strong presence of corruption
will not likely aim to ensure the protection of human trafficking victims as the primary focus is
likely to be centered around the needs and wants of the individuals in charge of the country. Due
to this, it is probable that corruption will have a negative effect on protection. To control for this
effect, I included a control variable assessing the level of control that a state has on corruption as
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measured by the World Governance Indicators (WGI) project in 2013 under the World Bank
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2018).
To evaluate the effect of the interaction between the stringency of immigration policies
and the KOF political globalization score on a state’s protection score, a quasi-experiment at a
country level using the data available from the years 2013 and 2014 was conducted. The
dependent variable is lagged in order to account for the effect of the policies and events from
2013 on compliance decisions. While this dependent variable is only formed using a five-unit
scale, it was treated as a continuous variable as there is a theoretically accepted, unified
difference between each score on the scale. Because the theory suggests that a combination of
contrasting costs will result in a middle-ground effect on protection, it would not be beneficial to
dichotomize the dependent variable and run a logistic regression. If this variable was
dichotomized, it would only indicate whether or not a country offered protection for victims. It
would not show any midpoint; therefore, the dichotomization of the dependent variable would
eliminate a core part of this theory. With this established, the data was evaluated using a linear
regression model consisting of the continuous dependent variable, the two independent variables
along with the interaction, and the three control variables.
Data Analysis
As mentioned previously, a linear regression model was utilized to analyze any existing
relationships between the data. When running a regression model with all three independent
variables and the control, I fail to find support for my central hypothesis. The results of this
analysis are found in Model 1 of Table 2. Looking at Model 1 with the interaction, the first
independent variable of the KOF political globalization score was found to be significant at the
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99% confidence level. With a beta coefficient of 0.012, this indicates that, on average, a 0.012
increase in protection score will occur for every one unit change in the KOF score. Overall, this
means that a state’s compliance with protective human trafficking policies will increase as they
develop more international ties and become more active in the international community. Failing
to have a p-value less than 0.05, the dichotomous immigration policy variable was not
statistically significant. Following this, the interaction between the two variables also failed to
reach significance. According to these findings, there is not an interactive effect that occurs
between the KOF score and the presence of strict immigration policies. Furthermore,
immigration policies on their own also have no effect on the protection score of countries. While
these findings may not speak to the reasonings behind compliance, the significant KOF score
does provide insight into this topic on its own and warrants further attention, as will be discussed
later.
Of the three control variables, only corruption was statistically significant. The p-value
of the logged GDP control was 0.889. With a p-value so close to 1.00, it appears the GDP is not
systematically related to the protection score. Polity, despite having a much lower p-value, was
similarly insignificant. Unlike these two controls, the WGI corruption score variable was
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and had a beta coefficient of 0.242. This
denotes a 0.242 unit increase in protection score, on average, for every one unit change in the
corruption score. This means that as a state gains greater control over corruption, its protection
score will improve. Finally, when all variables are at a value of zero, the average protection
score for a state will be 1.810. Overall, this model explains about 23.7% of the variation in state
protection scores.
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After running a regression model with the interaction, another model was run without the
interaction variable. This model would allow for an analysis of the KOF score and the strictness
of the immigration policies to be conducted without any interference from the interaction. No
variable saw a change in the level of significance compared to what was previously detailed, but
a few had different beta coefficients as shown in Model 2 of Table 2. The beta coefficient for the
KOF score is now 0.013, indicating that a one unit increase in the score will result in a 0.013 unit
increase in a state’s protection score on average. The beta coefficient for the WGI corruption
score also changed. Without the interaction, there will be a 0.244 unit change on average in the
protection score for every one unit change in the WGI score. Because the interaction was found
to be insignificant in the first model, the true value for the WGI score is better depicted in this
second model and will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections. For this model,
the average protection score will be 1.792 when all other variables have a value of zero. This
model explains 24.2% of variation of the protection score.
Discussion
In this piece, I theorized that an interactive effect between international and domestic
conditions affected a country's willingness to comply with protectionist human trafficking
policies. However, based on my empirical analysis, I fail to find support for this hypothesis.
This indicates that the number of international ties intertwined with the stringency of
immigration policies does not systematically impact the level of protection that a state offers to
victims. Furthermore, and based on the results from the model without the inclusions of the
interaction, the fact that a state has strict immigration policies, or does not have strict policies,
bears no effect on a country’s protectionist policies. With the control of corruption and the KOF
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political globalization score showing as significant, however, it is not entirely out of the question
that domestic and international factors may impact compliance.
The idea that immigration is an indicator of a country's willingness or capability to
change is rooted in the ideas of mentality and cost. Countries with strict immigration policies are
thought to be focused on the idea that protectionist policies are subordinate to prosecutorial and
preventive policies. These states follow the mentality that the issue of human trafficking is better
resolved by increasing efforts aimed at furthering prosecution, including criminalizing all who
are in the country illegally regardless of their victim status. With this thought process, these
leaders are not as likely to ensure that protection is offered to victims as leaders who see
protection as being equivalent in importance to its two counterparts. The concept of cost is
demonstrated in the resources required, both tangible and intangible, to alter the domestic
policies and practice to be more compliant with protectionist policies. States with strict policies,
as discussed earlier in the paper, have a greater cost to comply as they have more alterations to
complete in order to boost compliance, decreasing the likelihood that these states will offer
protection. When the interaction failed to be significant, the test was conducted again with all
variables except the interaction. The data can be seen in Model 2 of Table 2.
With this new data, immigration remained insignificant while political globalization and
control of corruption remained significant. This finding led to the thought that perhaps domestic
factors should not be looked at in terms of mentality but instead should be looked at in terms of
capacity. Cost remains a factor as there is a cost to alter anything or to provide anything. More
importantly, however, is the ability to afford that cost. While immigration looked at the
willingness to assume such expenses, control of corruption looks at the ability. If a state cannot
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manage to control the corruption within its borders, it is improbable that it has the capacity to
extend resources to other areas such as victim protection. Furthermore, corruption is likely to
lead to a more favorable situation for the leaders than for the average citizen. More resources
will probably be spent ensuring the welfare, protection, and luxury of those in charge, leaving
little to provide for the remaining people. This variable shows that domestic factors are still
involved in compliance, but the data from this variable were not tested in conjunction with
international factors and can therefore not be used to support the overall theory. Perhaps this
idea can be tested in future research.
While domestic factors remain in a state of uncertainty, international factors, as measured
by the KOF political globalization score, showed to be significant in both models. Beyond
significance, the international involvement has a positive relationship with that country’s
protection efforts. As a country becomes more involved in the international community and
opens itself up to the pressures of compliance that come along with it, they are more likely to
comply with protectionist policies, which are now starting to receive greater international
attention. On the other side of the spectrum, states with few international ties are less likely to
adhere to such policies as they have not allowed themselves to be vulnerable to such scrutiny.
Connecting this back to the control of corruption, states that are involved in the international
community and who fail to adequately control corruption within their borders may attract greater
attention and face heightened international scrutiny as a result, pressuring them further to make
particular changes and offer greater compliance. As one factor has the potential to impact the
effects of the other, the two together continue to indicate the possibility of domestic and
international factors having an interactive effect on compliance.
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In summary, the overall theory is not supported by the data. Immigration failed to be a
significant variable and therefore has no systematic relationship with protection scores. While
the insignificance of the interaction in this research was similarly insignificant, future research
that focuses on domestic factors as a product of capacity rather than mentality may find different
results. Furthermore, the international community has changed greatly since the years that were
included in my empirical analysis. Newer data could also bear a different outcome, and
analyzing a larger period of time could help adjust for the spuriousness that may be present in the
data at any moment. In the end, the two significant variables demonstrate the importance of both
domestic factors and international factors as separate entities, but it cannot be concluded based
on this study that protection is a result of the two in relation to one another. The value of one
cannot be said to impact the effect of the other.
Conclusion
In this piece, I address a current gap in the human trafficking literature. Specifically, I
address the variation in protectionist human trafficking policies. Previous research has
predominantly centered around the idea that it is either domestic factors or international factors
that independently impact the provision of protection to victims. Rather than following this and
focusing on one factor individually, my theory instead emphasizes the interactive effect of both
levels. With the level of connections in the international community continuing to grow today, it
is necessary to include international pressure as a leading factor, but the theory would be
incomplete without addressing the domestic costs that drive the decisions of the government.
Although I fail to find support for my empirical analysis, further studies should explore the
reasoning for variation in protectionist policies.
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For human trafficking victims, protection is an element in the task of regaining a sense of
normalcy. Without being afforded the necessary protections, these victims risk being prosecuted
as an illegal immigrant by the country where they were trafficked. Protection policies help law
enforcement officers ensure that victims do not suffer further by being criminalized for
something that they had no choice in. Furthermore, such policies assist victims by offering
medical attention to help them recover physically, support to help them recover mentally, shelter
to offer protection, and job training to help return to an everyday lifestyle. While all of these
factors are essential to the recovery of victims, many states focus solely on prosecution without
granting much consideration to protection. Prosecution does help to punish traffickers and deter
trafficking in the future, helping individuals stay safe from becoming a victim of trafficking, but
it does nothing for those who have already suffered from the reality of human trafficking. If
states decide to forgo their responsibility to protect victims, they condemn the victims to suffer
further in their quest to simply regain a sense of normalcy.
To help improve protectionist policies around the world, leaders must first understand
what factors are involved in the decision to comply or not. If these factors are uncovered, they
can be utilized to encourage compliance from country leaders. For instance, the impact of
international pressure was discussed in several pieces of literature, as mentioned earlier, that
referenced its power to impose reputational costs. Members of the international community can
apply such pressure to states that fail to meet the international standard of protection, threatening
their reputation. While the international community does not have a true means of enforcement,
these pressures can prove to be quite effective. Encouraging greater compliance can help victims
receive the assistance that they so desperately need.
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Ultimately, these pressures can help reduce the gap between rights in principle and rights
in practice. States are very quick to try to acquire a strong position within the international
community. One way to improve their position is to reap the benefits that result from showing
the initiative to ratify treaties concerning major, global issues such as human trafficking. While
the community perceives such ratification as a promise to aid in the battle to end trafficking, the
truth is that this ratification is nothing more than a trivial gesture intended to obtain a greater
position for themselves. To help identify states that are likely posing as a supporter while
offering no resources, the international factors as well as domestic factors that encourage
compliance must be discovered. It is the combination of the two that will offer an avenue for the
identification of those who are likely to join in on the fight to resolve this salient issue and
further inspire them to provide greater protection.
In the future, it could be intriguing to utilize a time-series empirical analysis. This study
concludes that international factors are important in determining compliance, but the
international community has not always had such a strong influence over the actions of
countries. Before the rise of this influence, the question could be asked again as to what
influenced compliance. Considering the fact that international factors have been removed in this
instance, this would have to be a domestic factor. While immigration has been found to be
insignificant, the discussion surrounding corruption from a previous section could be a start for
this new investigation. By finding the factor that mattered before the international community
grew in power, insight could be provided into what else may impact the decisions of countries
today. This factor in conjunction with international pressures can create a full picture of what
drives protection compliance. This would continue to follow the theory that domestic policies
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and structures can influence the effect that international factors have on compliance. What
remains to be discovered is the domestic factor that influences the decisions of government
leaders. If these factors are discovered, a safer environment, characterized by greater protection,
can be provided for human trafficking victims.
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